In this paper we model epistemic actions or programs (induced by information exchanges between multiple agents A1, . . . , An ∈ A) as quantales, hence conceiving these epistemic programs as resources. Indeed, quantales are to locales what monoidal closed categories are to cartesian closed categories [1] ; while both locales and cartesian closed categories provide a semantics for Intuitionistic Logic, quantales and monoidal closed categories provide a semantics for (non-commutative) Multiplicative Linear Logic. Their syntax is Lambek calculus [18] . The quantale (Q, W , •) acts on an underlying Q-right module (M, W ) which contains the epistemic states, epistemic propositions and facts. The epistemic content is encoded by appearance maps, one pair f M A : M → M, f Q A : Q → Q of maps for each agent A ∈ A, which preserve both the quantale structure and the module structure. They give rise to epistemic modalities, i.e. knowledge, both with respect to propositions and actions. The module action ⊗ corresponds to epistemic updating and gives rise to dynamic modalities [13] e.g. weakest preconditions. We show how this model subsumes the crucial fragment of Dynamic Epistemic Logic [4], abstracting it in a constructive fashion while introducing resource-sensitive structure on the epistemic programs. We provide a sequent calculus (extending Lambek calculus) for these models in which actions, propositions as well as agents act as resources.
Introduction
Consider the following well-known example. After n children played in the mud k of them have mud on their forehead. They can of course see each other's foreheads but not their own ones. Their father initially announces "at least one of you has mud on his forehead". After that, their father asks k − 1 times whether they know if they are themselves dirty and k − 1 times they all simultaneously reply "no". Now the ones which have mud on their forehead will all know this. 1 This muddy children puzzle exposes the need for having a logical account of actions as dynamic and epistemic resources in situations of information exchange. In these situations each new repetition of the same announcement might add new information to the agents. Thus it makes a difference whether or not unlimited "supplies" of these actions are available. These dynamic resources constitute the usual use-only-once resources of linear logic [12] . Moreover, we will also deal with epistemic resources. In this case, presence of agents in a given situation (or availability of these agents as computing resources for other agents) makes a difference in the validity of some deductions and execution of some actions by other agents. In other words, some deductions are only valid (and some actions are only executable) in the presence of certain agents, i.e. valid not in the real world, but in the world as it appears to these agents. Note that agents and actions are not only resources but also "consumers of resources"; actions need certain preconditions to be executable and agents need certain contexts to be able do their reasoning.
In this paper we provide an algebraic model and a corresponding sequent calculus which enables us to encode and analyse situations like the above one. Agents and propositions as well as actions are considered in Lambekcalculus style sequents which will typically look like m 1 , . . . , q 1 , . . . , A 1 , . . . , m k , . . . , q l , . . . , A n δ where m 1 , . . . , m k are propositions, q 1 , . . . , q l are actions and A 1 , . . . A n are agents which resolve into a single proposition or action δ. The fragment of the calculus restricted to actions is the Lambek calculus [18] , which can
The algebra of epistemic programs and epistemic propositions
A sup-lattice L is a complete lattice with maps which preserve arbitrary joins as its homomorphism. We denote bottom and top of L by ⊥ and respectively, and its atoms by Atm(L). A sup-lattice is atomistic iff each element can be written as the supremum of the atoms below it. Every sup-homomorphism f * : L → M has a right Galois adjoint f * : M → L, i.e. f * (a) ≤ b ⇔ a ≤ f * (b), which preserves arbitrary infima. We denote an adjoint pair by f * f * . In computational terms, the right Galois adjoint f * assigns weakest preconditions given the program f * .
A quantale is a sup-lattice Q equipped with a monoid structure (Q, •, 1) which is such that for all a ∈ Q the maps a • − : Q → Q and − • a : Q → Q preserve arbitrary joins, hence they have right Galois adjoints a • − a \ − and − • a −/a explicitly given by
A quantale homomorphism is both a sup-homomorphism and a monoid-homomorphism. Examples of quantales are: the set sup(L) of all sup-endomorphisms of a complete lattice L ordered pointwisely; the set of all relations from a set X to itself ordered by pointwise inclusion -this quantale is isomorphic to sup(P(X)); the powerset of any monoid with composition extended by continuity. Since quantales are monoidal closed categories they provide a semantics for (non-commutative) Multiplicative Linear Logic [1] : linearity of monoidal closed categories follows by the absence of natural morphisms ∆ A : A → A⊗A and left and right projections p 1 : A⊗B → A and p 2 : B ⊗ A → A, and hence quantales (in general) do not satisfy a ≤ a&a nor a&b ≤ a nor b&a ≤ a . Hence we do not have weakening nor contraction in the corresponding logic [12] . By non-commutativity we moreover do not have exchange in the logic. A Q-right module for a quantale Q is a sup-lattice M with a module action − ⊗ − : M × Q → M which preserves arbitrary joins in both arguments, m ⊗ 1 = m and m ⊗ (q 1 • q 2 ) = (m ⊗ q 1 ) ⊗ q 2 for all m ∈ M and all q 1 , q 2 ∈ Q. We have two adjoints − ⊗ q [q]− and m ⊗ − {m}− where
As for some examples, a quantale Q is a Q-right module over itself with composition as the tensor and a complete lattice L is a sup(L)-right module with function application as the tensor. For details on quantales, Q-modules and also Q-enrichment we refer to [17, 23, 25, 26] . For applications of these in computing, linguistics and physics we refer to [1, 8, 14, 18, 21, 24] .
Our notion of endomorphism differs from the one in the literature in that we do not fix the quantale Q (cf. also modules of rings and corresponding categories). This change of base is however crucial for our developments.
is a system and {f A } A∈A are system-endomorphisms. 2 The elements of A are called agents, the elements of Q are called epistemic programs and the elements of M are called epistemic propositions.
We will now interpret all data and all structure requirements of Definition 2.2. 
then agent A possesses strictly more knowledge in epistemic state s than in epistemic state s . From this it should also be obvious why we took the f M A -maps to be covariant with respect to the order: weakening the specification of the state goes with weakening the specification of appearance. The additional preservations of suprema will assure the right properties and existence of epistemic modalities (see below). If for epistemic state s ∈ S we have f M A (s) < f M B (s) agent A possesses strictly more knowledge than agent B in state s. This knowledge is however not necessarily correct! If for states s ∈ S and m ∈ M with s ≤ m we have f M A (s) ≤ m then agent A has been deluded, that is, he believes incorrect information, e.g. due to deceit of another agent (see below), a malfunctioning communication channel or corrupted data.
Knowledge. For each agent A ∈ A we introduce an epistemic modality M
A standing for agent A's knowledge as the adjoint to the appearance map, i.e. f M A M A . Indeed, by adjunction we have f M A (s) ≤ m iff s ≤ M A m, i.e. iff "in state s agent A knows (or believes) m". We identify some basic properties of M A . Since M A is a right Galois adjoint, it preserves arbitrary meets: M A ( i m i ) = i M A m i ; hence it preserves the empty meet and binary meets, and is monotone. So in any epistemic system we have
When M is a frame 3 we can internalize the partial order using the defining property of a Heyting algebra. In the special case that Q = {1} and A = { * } we obtain the intuitionistic modal logic IntK of [28] . If M is moreover a complete boolean algebra (e.g. the powerset of its atoms) then Kripke's axiom K follows i.e.
Diamonds and corresponding rules arise in that case by duality. Note that to each f M A one can associate an accessibility relation Epistemic actions. Deterministic epistemic actions are to be thought of as special epistemic programs. 4 If for epistemic programs q, q ∈ Q we have q ≤ q then q is less deterministic than q e.g. q is obtained from q by making an aspect of q depend on the outcome of a coin-toss. Hence the suprema i q i in the quantale of epistemic programs capture non-deterministic choices of simple (deterministic) epistemic actions {q i } i [8] . The appearance maps f Q A : Q → Q encode how agents perceive epistemic actions. This allows us to accommodate various epistemic actions of DEL [4] , such as information hiding or encrypting, e.g. q < f Q A (q), and misinformation such as lying, cheating and other deceit, e.g. q ≤ f Q A (q). Since the f Q A -maps are sup-homomorphisms we can set f Q A Q A and hence for each agent A ∈ A we have a modality Q A standing for agent A's knowledge of actions.
when action q is happening, agent A thinks action q to be happening" -note that this interpretation implies that any action subsumes all weaker ones. These modalities Q A satisfy the same properties as M A . The quantale multiplication stands for sequential composition of epistemic programs. Since sequentially performed actions are perceived sequentially, the f Q A -maps indeed have to preserve the quantale multiplication. The multiplicative unit 1 of Q is the void epistemic action (called skip in [4] ).
Epistemic updating. The tensor encodes the crucial notion of epistemic updating. After performing an epistemic program q ∈ Q on an initial epistemic state m ∈ M , we obtain a new epistemic state m ⊗ q ∈ M . Since each agent updates his knowledge according to how he perceives the epistemic action, it is clear that
The fact that they relate through an inequality (eq.(1)) rather than through an equality expresses possible learning of agents as the result of epistemic update. Some of the sub-actions of the program might not be applicable to some of the sub-states of the proposition. This results in the elimination of some of the clauses of the appearance of update to the agent and makes the left hand side stronger than the right hand side. Note that a crucial difference with the semantics of DEL in [4] is that, while in our axiomatic approach both sequential composition of epistemic programs and the update operation are internal operations, in DEL they are constructions on Kripke models (see below).
Dynamic modalities.
Since both tensor − ⊗ − and quantale multiplication − • − preserve suprema in both arguments, a range of residuals arises, respectively with respect to update and sequential composition:
for each m ∈ M and each q ∈ Q. The dynamic modalities [q] are the usual ones in dynamic logic [13] , that is, weakest preconditions. We read [q]ϕ as "after q we have ϕ". The other ones are variants on these e.g. [14] . In particular the ones with respect to sequential composition correspond to the residuals of Lambek calculus [18] .
Preconditions. If m ⊗ q = ⊥ then the epistemic action q cannot be applied to the state m. The kernel of a program q ∈ Q is
and comprises the precondition of q, that is, it contains the epistemic propositions to which q cannot be applied.
Since Ker(q) =↓ ( Ker(q)), "not being in the precondition of q" exists as a proposition in M for all q ∈ Q. In DEL [4] preconditions constitute an extra piece of data which has to be specified for each action.
Stable facts. Another extra piece of data in DEL [4] are the facts, that is, propositions which cannot be altered by the epistemic actions/programs. We define the stabilizer of Q as
It consists of those epistemic propositions which are stable under the epistemic programs: [q]ϕ = ϕ decomposes into (i) [q]ϕ ≤ ϕ which expresses the fact that the weakest precondition for ϕ with respect to action q entails ϕ, that is, validity of ϕ cannot be created by epistemic actions, and (ii) ϕ ≤ [q]ϕ ⇔ ϕ ⊗ q ≤ ϕ which expresses preservation of validity of ϕ. Conclusively, epistemic propositions both encode actual facts and the knowledge of each agent, that is, both factual and epistemic content.
Examples of epistemic programs and epistemic systems
We present some examples of special epistemic programs which may exist in an epistemic system (M, Q, f A ) A∈A . The crucial difference with DEL [4] is that in absence of negation we cannot define announcements in general, but we can always define refutations. Public refutation of the proposition m ∈ M is an epistemic program q ∈ Q with f Q A (q) = q for all A ∈ A and for which Ker(q) =↓ m. Private refutation to subgroup is also a program that privately refutes a proposition m to the subgroup β of agents. Ker(q) is the same as before and f Q
Failure test of a proposition m is a program q that tests when m fails. It is a particular case of private refutation where m is refuted to an empty set of agents Ker(q) =↓ m and f Q A (q) = 1 for all A ∈ A. Public announcement is also definable in our setting. However, while "being not in the precondition of q" is a proposition in M for all q ∈ Q, "being in the precondition of q" in general isn't one. To see this consider the lattice {⊥ ≤ a, b, c ≤ } with q such that Ker(q) = {⊥, a}, then both b and c are in the precondition but b ∨ c = isn't. The reason for this is that this lattice is non-boolean with a not having a complement. Hence public announcement of the proposition m ∈ M is an epistemic program q ∈ Q for which f A (q) = q and for which Ker(q) has a boolean complement ( Ker(q)) c , satisfying ( Ker(q)) c = m. Private announcement to a subgroup can be defined analogously.
The muddy children puzzle. We encode the puzzle in an epistemic system. The set of agents A includes the children C 1 , · · · , C n . We assume that C 1 , · · · , C k for 1 < k ≤ n are dirty. The module M includes all possible initial states s β with β ⊆ A being those children that have mud on their forehead. Since the children cannot see their own foreheads (which might either be dirty or not) we have f M Ci (s β ) = s β\{Ci} ∨ s β∪{Ci} . Let D ∅ be the fact that no child has a dirty forehead and let D i be the fact that the i'th child has a dirty forehead, hence
Let q 0 ∈ Q be father's announcement that at least one child has mud on his forehead i.e. Ker(q 0 ) =↓ D ∅ and f Q Ci (q 0 ) = q 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proposition 3.1 After the k − 1's rounds of refutations, child j for 1 ≤ j ≤ k knows that he is dirty i.e.
where (•q) (k−1) denotes •q • · · · • q with k − 1 occurrences of q.
Proof. We proceed by induction. If we move the dynamic modalities in eq.(2) to the left by adjunction we obtain
using the module structure. After moving the epistemic modality to the left and applying eq.(1) we obtain
By distributivity of ∨ over ⊗ it then follows by the definition of suprema that it suffices to prove
We respectively refer to these inequalities as eq.(4l ) and eq.(4r). First we show that eq.(4l ) holds for all k.
where the last inequality follows by D j ∈ Stab(Q). Hence eq.(4l ). Now we prove the base case k = 1 of our
To prove eq.(4r) we use the inductive hypothesis in terms of eq.(3). By symmetry of {C 1 , · · · , C k } we have
i.e. eq.(4r), what completes the proof. 2
Analysing the dynamics of this proof we notice that in each inductive step we show that the epistemic state s {C1,··· ,C k } ⊗ q 0 (⊗q) (k−1) is included in the kernel of the refutation q cf. eq.(5). This inductive update reflects the systematic update of the children's knowledge during the process. Such a dynamics is not visible in the proofs performed in static epistemic logic [10] where there is no notion of update.
A cryptographic attack. This cryptographic attack is a somewhat simplified version of the man in the middle (MITM) attack which is a primary defect of public key-based systems. Two agents A and B share a secret key so that they can send each other encrypted messages over some communication channel. The channel is not secure: some outsider C may interpret the messages or prevent them from being delivered (although he cannot read them because he does not have the key). Suppose the encryption method is publicly known but the key is secret. It is also known that A is the only one who knows an important secret for example if some fact P holds or not. Suppose now that A sends an encrypted message to B communicating the secret. B gets the message and he is convinced that it must be authentic. Now both A and B are convinced that they share the secret and that C doesn't. However suppose that C notices two features of the specific encryption method: first that the shape of the encrypted message can show whether it contains a secret or it is just junk, second that without knowing the key or the content of the message he can modify the encrypted message to its opposite i.e. if it originally said P holds, it will now say that P does not hold. The outsider C will then secretly intercept the message, change it appropriately and send it to B without knowing the secret. Now A and B mistakenly believe that they share the secret, while in fact B got the wrong secret instead! C has succeeded to manipulate their beliefs. We can encode this situation in an epistemic system. The agents include {A, B, C}. Let s, t ∈ M satisfy s ≤ P and t P . The only agent that knows if P holds or not is A thus f A (s) = s and similarly f A (t) = t. On the other hand B and C do not know this so
Call the message in which P holds P and the one in which it does not holdP . The epistemic actions that correspond to the cryptographic attack are the following: α in which the message P is intercepted, modified and sent to B, β in which the messageP is intercepted, modified and sent to B, α in which A sends the message P to B, β in which A sends the messageP to B, and finally γ which corresponds to sending a junk message. Thus {α, β, α , β , γ} ⊆ Q and P,P ∈ Stab(Q) and P ∧P = ⊥, P ∨P = . In actions α and β agent C is uncertain about which message P orP has been sent so f C (α) = f C (β) = α ∨ β. On the other hand, agent A is sure that he has sent a message (either that P holds or that it doesn't) to B and that B has received exactly the same secret i.e. The epistemic program α ∨ β expresses the action of communicating the secret P orP in the above scenario. Now let us update the state s with the epistemic program α ∨ β and show that after update, if P holds, then A knows that B knows that P holds i.e. s ⊗ (α ∨ β)
, and order preservation of f B will give us
. By the assumption s ≤ P we obtain s ⊗ α ≤ P ⊗ α which leads to s ⊗ α ≤ P because P is a fact.
Encoding Dynamic Epistemic Logic
We slightly recast DEL [4] in such a way that it enables a smooth passage to our algebraic setting. Part of this involves the introduction of non-determinism for both states and actions. 
States and programs.
and that of an epistemic proposition P over S and an epistemic program π over as the epistemic proposition
It can be seen that P ⊗ π = ⊥ iff P ∩ µ(π) = ∅ where ⊥ is the epistemic proposition (false) over S given by the empty set of states ∅ ⊆ S. The dynamic modalities arise as [π]P := Q ∈ P (S) Q ⊗ π ⊆ P . The sequential composition 1 • 2 over S of two action models 1 and 2 both over S is defined as
The action model over a state model S contains a skip iff skip = {skip}, µ skip = S = P (S) and f A (skip) = {skip}. Skip is a unit both for update product and sequential composition. The sequential composition of two epistemic programs π 1 over 1 and π 2 over 2 is the epistemic proposition π 1 • π 2 := π 1 × π 2 over 1 • 2 .
Concrete epistemic systems.
We now have all the tools to make the passage from DEL [4] to epistemic systems. A DEL model is a pair (S, ) where S is a state model and is an action model over S, and which is such that 'skip' ∈ Σ, (S ⊗ Σ) ⊆ S and (Σ • Σ) ⊆ Σ. Given a DEL model (S, ), a concrete epistemic system is the triple (P(S), P(Σ), f A ) A∈A which goes equipped with valuation µ, and all other operations of the DEL model extended to P(S) and P(Σ) as we showed above.
It is possible to force the equality on eq.(1) by introducing the notion of coherence .
A strong system endomorphism is a system endomorphism where for all coherent pairs (m, q) we have 
The sequent calculus of epistemic systems
We define the objects of our sequent calculus by mutual induction on two sets, the set of formulas denoted as m ∈ L M and the set of epistemic programs denoted as q ∈ L Q , respectively
where A is in the set A of agents, p is in the set Φ of facts, s is in a set V M of atomic propositional variables, and σ is in a set V Q of atomic action variables. We denote by L M the set of all m-formulas, by L Q the set of all q-formulas, and by A the set of agents. We have two kinds of sequents,
To describe what these sequents mean, we extend the notation to two operations 
we put Γ := (((( γ 1 ) γ 2 ) γ 3 ) · · · ) γ n , where is the top element of M for M -sequents, and the unit element of Q for Q-sequents. 5 Obviously we have Define a satisfaction relation |= on L M as m |= m ⇔ m ≤ m , similarly on L Q we define q |= q ⇔ q ≤ q , and finally on both as 6 m |= q ⇔ (m, q) coherent and q = ⊥ . Now a sequent Γ δ (for either M or Q ) is said to be valid iff Γ |= δ. We also allow sequents with empty consequents, denoted as Γ . We interpret such a sequent as being equivalent to Γ ⊥, or in other words Γ = ⊥.
The meaning of a sequent. To provide the reader with a way to "read" our sequents, we can express the intuitive meaning of a sequent Γ δ in the following inductive manner:
• M m means that proposition m holds in all contexts, similarly M q means that action q is executable in all contexts.
• Q q means that action q is consistent with not changing the current state, i.e. q does not necessarily change the state.
• A, Γ M δ means that agent A knows, or believes, that Γ M δ holds. So this captures features of A's own reasoning: the sequent Γ M δ is accepted by A as a valid argument.
• q, Γ M δ means that, after action q happens, the sequent Γ M δ will hold.
• m, Γ M δ means that, in context m (i.e. in any situation in which m is true), the sequent Γ M δ must hold.
• A, Γ Q δ means agent A knows, or believes, that Γ Q δ holds.
• Finally, q, Γ Q δ simply means that the sequent q • Γ Q δ holds.
For instance, the sequent m, A, q, B, m M m can be read as: in context m, agent A believes that after action q agent B will believe that, in context m , proposition m must hold .
This reading shows that our sequent calculus expresses two forms of resource sensitivity. One is the use-onlyonce form of linear logic [12] that comes from the quantale structure on epistemic programs. This, as will be seen later, is encoded in the Lambek calculus rules on Q-sequents and the fact that standard structural rules only hold in a restricted form in our setting. One could call these dynamic resources . The other form deals with epistemic resources : the resources available to each agent that enable him to reason in a certain way (i.e. to deduct a result from some assumptions). These resources are encoded in the way the context appears to the agent in sequents, for instance Γ in the sequent Γ, A, Γ M δ is the context, and hence f A (Γ) is the resource that enables agent A to do the Γ M δ reasoning. Note that Γ M δ might not be a valid sequent in the context Γ, but it is valid in the context given by Γ's appearance to agent A. To summarize, in our setting not only propositions, but also actions and agents are treated as resources (available or not for other actions or for reasoning of other agents).
Sequent rules.
The rules for identity, ⊥, , and 1 are the same for both M and Q sequents. So in the following we drop the subscripts of :
The operational rules for M -sequents are 7 6 For the definition of coherence refer to definition 4.1 7 f A M R(L) stands for the right (left) f A rule in M-sequents (and similarly for Q-sequents).
We can add one additional rule specifically for strong epistemic systems. This rule which allows for arbitrary initial contexts is the extended version of the previously introduced
Soundness. One verifies that these rules are sound with regard to the model of section 2. Concerns about completeness constitute on-going work.
Example. In order to deal with the cryptographic attack presented in section 3, we first have to translate the situation into our sequent system using the encoding axioms and rules. Note that these axioms and rules are only applicable to concrete epistemic systems. In the concrete case the precondition (µ map) of each action is a given piece of date. In our example they are µ(α) = µ(α ) = P and µ(β) = µ(β ) =P . These maps are translated into the AEAx action encoding axioms P α,P β, P α ,P β , and the following AE 1 action encoding rules for actions α and α Γ,
The valuation on states s and t is translated into the following state encoding axioms s P t P (SEAx 1 ), s,P t, P (SEAx 2 ) .
The f A and f B maps for s and t, that is, f A (s) = s, f A (t) = t, and f B (s) = f B (t) = {s, t}, give us the following SE 1 state encoding rules
Finally 
Further elaborations
We list some possible further elaborations on our work.
Quantale enrichment. Each system (M, Q), that is, a quantale Q and a Q-right module M can be equivalently represented as a Q-enriched category M which is both tensored and cotensored [26] . Indeed, we set Ob(M) := M and M(m, m ) := {m}m ∈ Q for all m, m ∈ M . One verifies that in this case − ⊗ − : M × Q → M is a tensor and that [−]− : Q × M → M is a cotensor. This would allow a passage from a dynamic epistemic theory of programs to a dynamic epistemic theory of program transformations by substituting the quantale with a oneobject biclosed bicategory -a quantale is a one-object biclosed bicategory which is locally thin. The two-cells in the bicategory would then encode the program transformations.
Resource sensitivity. We would like to make our systems more resource sensitive, for example to deal with dynamic epistemic issues such as logical omniscience [19] . The two examples below might provide useful insights, fragments and tools. (i) In the money games of [16] the resource, i.e., money x ∈ R + , is encoded using the quantale structure of R + as a base for enrichment. The underlying lattices are free lattices which adds linearity to the propositions. They moreover admit a game-theoretic interpretation [16] . (ii) The logic of bunched implications of [22] also provides a model to to handle resources which freely combines intuitionistic additive and multiplicative linear structure via contexts. The semantics in terms of Grothendieck sheaves of the additives again indicates a monoid-enriched structure in the sense of [26] .
Approximation and probability. We can conceive the modules in our setting as a more general type of partial orders than merely an algebraic logic. We can accommodate additional computational structure e.g. a domain structure [11] , quantitative valuations of content [20] , or a combination of these which enables accommodating probabilities as shown in [6] -the partial order on probability measures introduced in [7] is defined in terms of a Bayesian update operation.
Coalgebra. It would be worthwhile to blend the algebraic features exposed in our approach with the well-studied coalgebraic features of epistemic logic e.g. [3] .
